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Abstract 
Can a short survey instrument reliably measure a range of fundamental economic preferences across diverse 
settings? We focus on survey questions that systematically predict behavior in incentivized experimental 
tasks among German university students (Becker et al. 2016) and were implemented among representative 
samples across the globe (Falk et al. 2018). This paper presents results of an experimental validation 
conducted among low-income individuals in Nairobi, Kenya. We find that quantitative survey measures -- 
hypothetical versions of experimental tasks -- of time preference, attitude to risk and altruism are good 
predictors of choices in incentivized experiments, suggesting these measures are broadly experimentally 
valid. At the same time, we find that qualitative questions -- self-assessments -- do not correlate with the 
experimental measures of preferences in the Kenyan sample. Thus, caution is needed before treating self-
assessments as proxies of preferences in new contexts. 
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Introduction 
Fundamental preferences in the economic domain, such as time discounting and risk preferences, and in 
the social domain, such as altruism, reciprocity and spitefulness, constitute key elements of individual 
decision-making. Figuring out ways to accurately measure these preferences among large samples in the 
field holds considerable promise since doing so may shed light on the sources of vast differences in 
preferences observed across individuals and societies, and their role in fundamental economic choices and 
societal trajectories. While measuring preferences using incentivized tasks is generally considered the gold 
standard,1 implementing incentivized tasks among large samples outside of the controlled environment of 
an experimental laboratory is often infeasible, given that they are relatively expensive and time consuming. 
Consequently, a potentially attractive alternative is to employ survey questions instead of incentivized 
experiments, but there has long been widespread concern that non-incentivized self-reported survey 
measures of preferences may not reliably capture real life choices. 
To tackle this important methodological trade-off, Falk et al. (2018) have recently developed a 
short (7-8 minutes) innovative survey module, designed to measure a wide range of economic preferences. 
It has been implemented among representative samples of subjects in more than seventy countries (Falk et 
al., 2018), creating the most comprehensive global data set with comparable measures of preferences, 
namely, the Global Preference Survey (GPS). Measures of preferences in each domain are constructed as a 
weighted average based on one objective quantitative item -- a hypothetical version of an experimental task 
-- and one subjective qualitative item that measures self-reported willingness to act in a certain way.  
To establish the validity of the survey preference measures, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, Falk, & 
Sunde (2016) perform a careful experimental validation of the survey questions, and document that survey 
measures of preferences do predict choices in incentivized decisions. The validation was conducted among 
students at University of Bonn, Germany. Given the wide coverage of the existing GPS data set and the 
convenience of the survey module in terms of implementation,2 it has the potential to become a widely 
adopted instrument for (i) studying differences in preferences across societies and their relationships with 
economic outcomes, (ii) employing preference measures as control variables when identifying causal 
                                                          
1 Experimental measures of preferences have been shown to predict a wide range of real-life behavior (e.g., Ashraf, 
Karlan, & Yin, 2006; Burks, Carpenter, Goette, & Rustichini, 2009; Meier & Sprenger, 2010; Rustagi, Engel, & 
Kosfeld, 2010; Sutter, Kocher, Glätzle-Rützler, & Trautmann, 2013). 
2 There is a laudable public good element in the GPS project. The global data set, as well as the survey instrument - 
and its 116 versions for 70 countries and 78 different languages - are readily available to researchers at 
https://www.briq-institute.org/global-preferences/home. Our validation experiment benefited greatly from this 
transparency, as we build on the Swahili translation of the survey module for Kenya.  
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effects of other factors correlated with preferences, and (iii) as outcome variables in new randomized 
controlled trials aiming to uncover the effects of various interventions on individual preferences.3 
This paper adds to these efforts and aims to be useful in three ways. First, we test the experimental 
validity of the survey questions outside of a sample of university students from a rich country, by focusing 
on a sample from the other end of the global distribution of income and education. Our experimental 
subjects are residents of working class neighborhoods (sometimes referred to as “slums”) in Nairobi, 
Kenya, a setting with different set of institutions and economic constraints. The participants are aged 
between 20-46, with average income of around USD 3 per day, and 54% are unemployed. Establishing the 
experimental validity of the measures among this subject pool is important for several reasons. Most of 
humanity lives in low and middle income countries, outside of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and 
Democratic societies (Henrich et al. 2010), in which the original GPS validation was conducted. Next the 
GPS module is particularly suitable to be integrated into large-scale follow-up surveys in randomized 
control trials, which are routinely implemented by development economists (Banerjee and Duflo 2012), 
often in Africa, and thus knowledge of whether the survey preference measures predict incentivized 
behavior among low-income individuals in Kenya is a useful input for scholars considering the adoption of 
these measures.4  
Second, comparing the results of analogous validations conducted in Germany and Kenya is 
methodologically interesting, because measures of economic preferences in GPS are derived from both 
objective quantitative tasks as well as subjective qualitative questions, based on self-assessments.5 There is 
a legitimate concern that subjective self-assessments might be understood and interpreted in different ways 
across countries, which can attenuate their ability to uncover personality traits and complicate cross-country 
comparisons. For example, the Big Five measures of personality traits, the most widely-used method to 
measure and classify personality traits in psychology, are based on self-assessments, and recent attempts to 
validate the Big Five measures have failed to reliably predict the intended personality traits in low- or 
                                                          
3 To date, the GPS measures have been used to explore global variations of preferences and their relationships with 
country-level and individual-level characteristics (Falk et al., 2018), deep historical origins of variation of preferences 
(Becker, Enke, and Falk 2018) and the relationships between economic development and gender differences in 
preferences (Falk & Hermle, 2018).  
4 Indeed, this experimental validation itself took place as a part of a larger project that aims to estimate the long-term 
effects on individual preferences of a randomized public health intervention (a school-based deworming program) 
which took place in Western Kenya in the late 1990s (Baird et al. 2016; Miguel and Kremer 2004). We used lessons 
from the current validation exercise in the design of a preference survey module that is integrated into the most recent 
round of follow-up data collection (Kenyan Life Panel Survey, KLPS, round 4). 
5 An example of a qualitative question from GPS would be “Please tell me, in general, how willing or unwilling you 
are to take risks, using a scale from 0 to 10”, or “How willing are you to give to a charity without expecting anything 
in return?” 
4 
 
middle-income countries, in contrast to samples from the wealthy countries for which they were originally 
developed (Laajaj et al. 2019; Gurven et al. 2013). An advantage of GPS is that, besides self-assessments, 
it also contains quantitative questions that are arguably less subject to this issue, because they directly define 
the parameters and nature of the decision and more closely mirror the incentivized experimental task. Thus, 
we can test whether quantitative questions are relatively more robust predictors of actual incentivized 
behavior across two diverse settings, as compared to qualitative self-assessments. 
Third, we place additional emphasis on the types of preferences that are likely to be especially 
important in settings with low social capital and a history of inter-group conflict, issues that are particularly 
pressing in low-income countries (Blattman and Miguel 2010). While pro-social preferences, such as 
altruism and positive reciprocity, help to establish and maintain cooperative and fair group outcomes even 
in situations with limited scope for reputation-building (Bowles 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003), anti-
social preferences (such as spitefulness and aggressive competitiveness) can contribute to the deterioration 
of co-operation (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005; Herrmann, Thoni, & Gachter, 2008).6 Furthermore, 
ethnic biases in social preferences -- in-group favoritism and out-group hostility -- create fertile ground for 
violent inter-group conflict. While the GPS focuses on measuring preferences relevant for explaining 
positive aspects of human social behavior, such as generalized altruism and reciprocity, we also assess the 
experimental validity of survey questions designed to measure the dark side of human social behavior. 
Specifically, we test the validity of questions designed to uncover anti-social preferences, such as spite, and 
distinguish between generalized, in-group, and out-group preferences, along both prosocial and anti-social 
dimensions.  
 
Experimental design 
The sample in our study are 123 subjects from the Kibera neighborhood in Nairobi, Kenya. The participants 
come from a low-income environment, are between 20 and 46 years of age, more than half are unemployed, 
half are women and, on average, they have two children (Table A1). The experiments were implemented 
in a state-of-the-art experimental economics laboratory in the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics 
(Haushofer et al. 2014). 
                                                          
6 Anti-social preferences – malevolent willingness to harm others at a cost to self – have been shown to be relatively 
widespread in numerous settings in both high and low income settings (Abbink and Sadrieh 2009; Fehr, Hoff, and 
Kshetramade 2008; Herrmann, Thoni, and Gachter 2008; Prediger, Vollan, and Herrmann 2014; Bauer, Cahlíková, 
Chytilová, et al. 2018; Bauer, Cahlíková, Katreniak, et al. 2018). 
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Subjects were invited to the lab twice, for visits one week apart, where the time gap was introduced 
in order to minimize spillovers between the survey and experimental measures. During one visit, they made 
choices in a set of incentivized experiments, while during the other, they answered non-incentivized survey 
questions. The order of experiments/survey was randomized on an individual level. We elicited measures 
of the following types of preferences: (i) time discounting, (ii) risk preference, (iii) ambiguity aversion, (iv) 
altruism (generalized, in-group, and out-group), (v) anti-social behavior (generalized, in-group, and out-
group), and (vi) positive reciprocity.  
The experimental choices involved high stakes, in order to capture decision situations with 
substantial financial consequences for the subjects. Specifically, each subject received a show-up fee (KSh 
450 for the survey part and KSh 250 for the experimental part, where 100 KSh was roughly equal to 1 USD 
during the study period) and a payoff determined by one randomly selected choice made in the experimental 
part. The average payoff from experiments was KSh 820, i.e., the equivalent of approximately 2.5 days’ 
typical earnings. Each type of preference was elicited using one experimental task. The full experimental 
protocol is available in the Online Appendix C and D. 
For time discounting, subjects made 25 binary choices between an immediate payment or a larger 
payment with a three-month delay, which was increased by a fixed amount in each subsequent binary 
choice, using a multiple price list. Similarly, when eliciting risk preference, subjects made 21 binary choices 
between a lottery that yielded a positive amount or zero with equal probability, and a safe payment option 
that increased in each subsequent binary choice. Ambiguity aversion was measured by a binary choice 
between two bags – one with a known and one with an unknown composition of differently colored balls, 
with the payoff determined by drawing a ball of a specific color.  
In the experiments focusing on the social domain, altruism was measured by the choice of how 
much of an endowment the participant decided to donate to a charity. One choice measured donations to a 
charity which helps people in Kenya (generalized altruism), the second choice elicited donations to a charity 
which helps people from the participant’s ancestral home area (in-group altruism), and the third elicited 
donations to a charity which helps people in Kenya outside of the subject’s own ancestral home area (out-
group altruism). Anti-social behavior was measured using a binary choice in which subjects could decide 
to reduce the payoff of another person by sacrificing a part of their own payoff. Again, we implemented 
three versions, using the same wording as above to indicate generalized, in-group, and out-group versions 
of the task. Finally, positive reciprocity was measured by the amount of money given to a person who had 
been kind to the participant. This person was an anonymous participant in a different, earlier experiment in 
the lab who decided to leave a gift (a bag of sugar, which is a popular gift item in the setting we study) for 
a future visitor of the lab (i.e.,  decision-maker of our study), instead of keeping all the sugar for him or 
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herself. As an alternative measure of reciprocity, we used the difference in the amount donated to this (kind) 
person and to another (unkind) person who had decided not to give any sugar.  
In the survey part, we elicited one objective quantitative measure and one or two subjective 
qualitative measures for each type of preference.7 The quantitative questions presented a hypothetical 
scenario that mimicked the experimental task. For time and risk preferences, instead of asking the full set 
of questions as in the experiment, we used the “staircase” or “unfolding brackets” procedure, in which each 
participant answers a sub-set of five binary choices chosen based on their answer to the previous question. 
The qualitative questions measure self-reported willingness to act in a certain way on a 0-10 scale. 
Specifically, respondents rate their own willingness to give up something that is beneficial today in order 
to benefit more in the future (time discounting), to take risks (risk preference), to give to a charity and to 
share with others (altruism), to cause trouble for other people and to do harm to other people (anti-social 
preferences), and to return a favor (reciprocity). 
Note that the experimental validation in Nairobi is closely comparable to, but not strictly identical 
to, the preference measure validation conducted in Bonn (Becker et al. 2016). Some of the experimental 
tasks had to be simplified, reflecting the differences in average schooling between the Kenyan and German 
subject pools. We also slightly adjusted the wording in some of the GPS survey questions, based on 
feedback from piloting and focus-group discussions, in order to improve comprehension in the Kenyan 
context. In terms of procedure and data analysis, we use a similar approach as Becker et al. (2016). Please 
see the Online Appendix for details of each experimental task, questions used and the comparison of the 
Kenyan and German validation exercises. 
 To start, we observe that the elicited preference measures have several desirable properties (see 
Online Appendix Table A1 for summary statistics). First, there is substantial variation in all our measures 
of preferences, both survey and experimental, attenuating concerns that a failure to identify relationships 
between variables of interest could be mechanically driven by a lack of variation. Second, behavior in the 
experiments is largely comparable to previous studies. For example, in the generalized version of the 
dictator game (altruism measure), we observe that subjects allocate around 20% of their endowment to 
charity. We also find that subjects are significantly more willing to give to a charity that helps their own 
ethnic group, as compared to a charity that helps out-group members. Similarly, slightly fewer than 20% 
reduce another person’s income at a cost to themselves, which is comparable to the prevalence of anti-
                                                          
7 The only exception is ambiguity aversion, for which there is only one quantitative survey measure. 
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social behavior in other settings (Abbink and Sadrieh 2009; Prediger, Vollan, and Herrman 2014), and 
subjects are significantly more destructive towards out-group members.  
 
Results 
We begin by describing the predictive power of objective quantitative survey measures. For each survey 
item, Table 1 displays an OLS coefficient from a regression of the standardized experimental measure on 
the standardized survey item (column 1) and the Spearman correlation between the survey item and a 
respective experimental incentivized preference measure (column 2). We find that the quantitative survey 
measures of time preference, attitude to risk, generalized altruism, altruism towards one’s own ethnic group, 
and altruism towards out-group members are strongly positively correlated with experimental measures, 
and the observed relationships are statistically significant. The quantitative survey measure of ambiguity 
aversion and all three measures of anti-social behavior correlate weakly with the experimental measure: the 
correlations for all are relatively small in magnitude and none is significant at traditional levels. 
 Specifically, in terms of magnitudes, the correlations are 0.40 for time discounting, 0.25 for risk 
preference, 0.29 for positive reciprocity, 0.41 for generalized altruism, 0.36 for in-group altruism and 0.38 
for out-group altruism. These correlations are slightly lower than, though comparable to the correlation 
generated in the validation of the same set of survey preference measures in Germany (Becker et al. 2016), 
reported for comparison in column 3, in which the corresponding correlations were found to be 0.55 (time 
discounting), 0.34 (risk taking), 0.35 (positive reciprocity) and 0.39 (generalized altruism). We speculate 
that the somewhat smaller correlations in Kenya may potentially reflect greater measurement error in the 
elicitation of preferences among a subject pool with lower average schooling levels.   
The observed patterns are robust to controlling for the level of understanding, based on direct cross-
check questions, and violations of monotonicity (in tasks eliciting time and risk preferences, which use 
multiple price lists), an indirect proxy of understanding. The correlations are also similar for different order 
of the survey and experimental tasks (whether they were elicited during the first or second week), and robust 
to controlling for a set of basic individual characteristics (i.e., age, gender, being unemployed, and the 
number of children); the results of these robustness checks are presented in Online Appendix Table A2.  
Further, we address a concern which is inherent in this type of experimental validation, namely, 
that subjects may remember their choices from the previous week and choose the same options in the second 
week in order to appear consistent over time. To address this, we included an independent task to measure 
a subject’s memory. Specifically, in the first week, the participants were shown a set of ten letters on a 
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screen for twenty seconds and were incentivized to remember those letters for a short period. In the second 
week, they were asked to recall these ten letters, again in an incentive-compatible way. We show that the 
correlations observed between experimental and survey measures of preferences are not driven by subjects 
with more accurate recall (those remembering above the median number of letters), with the exception of 
the time preference measure (Table A3). 
Next, we explore the predictive power of the subjective survey self-assessments. In contrast to the 
objective survey measures, qualitative survey measures are rather poor predictors of the experimental 
measures of preferences (Table 2). None of the correlations reaches statistical significance at conventional 
levels when we use the Spearman correlation (column 2), and this is unlikely to be due to lack of power. 
The estimated coefficients are close to zero and in many cases do not have the expected sign: nine estimated 
correlations have expected signs, while seven have an opposite sign than predicted. In terms of magnitudes, 
none of the estimated 16 correlations is larger than 0.15. We arrive at a similar conclusion when using OLS 
regressions (column 1), with the exception of measures of positive reciprocity and out-group altruism, for 
which we find positive coefficients (0.21 and 0.18, resp.), significant at the 5% level.  
The overall pattern of (non)results differs sharply from the patterns observed in the German 
validation exercise, where subjective self-assessments reliably predict behavior in experimental tasks 
(column 3): all estimated coefficients are statistical significant, have the expected sign, and the magnitudes 
are at least 0.3, similar to the quantitative survey measures.  
 
Concluding remarks 
An experimental validation of survey preference measures in Kenya has several noteworthy implications. 
First, our results should boost confidence in the ability of objective quantitative GPS survey measures of 
preferences, based on hypothetical tasks, to predict high-stakes incentivized behavior in experiments 
designed to measure range of preferences. We show that quantitative survey measures of time preference, 
attitude to risk and generalized, in-group, and out-group altruism are good predictors of choices in 
incentivized experiments among residents of a working class Nairobi neighborhood. This finding reinforces 
the findings from a similar validation exercise performed among a sample of university students in Germany 
(Becker et al. 2016), and thus, together, the two studies document the experimental validity of these 
measures across culturally diverse settings at opposite ends of the global income and education distribution. 
At the same time, we find that the predictive power of subjective qualitative questions on 
preferences do not meaningfully correlate with the experimental measures in the Kenyan sample, in contrast 
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to the German sample. Thus, although in rich (mostly German) settings qualitative survey questions have 
been shown to do a good job of predicting behavior in incentivized experiments (Dohmen et al. 2011; 
Becker et al. 2016) and a range of real-life behaviors (Barasinska, Schaefer, and Stephan 2012; 
Bauernschuster et al. 2014; Bonin et al. 2007; Fouarge, Kriechel, and Dohmen 2014; Jaeger et al. 2010; 
Dohmen et al. 2011),  caution is needed before interpreting these measures as proxies of preferences in all 
contexts, especially low-income settings. Based on our evidence alone, it is unclear how widely the 
validation results from Germany will apply, and assessing this should be an important focus of future work. 
Since our findings suggest that the experimental validity of subjective self-assessments are likely to be 
economically and culturally specific8, we hope they will motivate implementation of series of comparable 
validation exercises in other diverse settings across the globe, in order to better understand the 
characteristics of societies for which the qualitative self-assessment are informative. Future research may 
also need to determine whether alternative formulations of qualitative questions are more reliable than 
current self-assessments. 
Finally, this study also tested the experimental validity of survey preference measures in a new 
domain, anti-social preferences, which is arguably most prone to social desirability biases. We document 
that survey measures of anti-social preferences only weakly predict incentivized behavior, which 
strengthens the case for investing resources into gathering incentivized measures in this domain.  
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Table 1: Correlations between quantitative survey measures and experimental measures 
      Kenya: Kibera residents   Germany: Bonn students 
Preference Quantitative survey item OLS 
Coefficient 
Correlation   Correlation Measures 
      (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Time   Staircase measure: 5 interdependent choices 
between an early and delayed amount of 
money 
0.33*** 0.40***   0.55*** comparable 
                
Risk   Staircase measure: 5 interdependent choices 
between a lottery and varying safe options 
0.21** 0.25***   0.34*** comparable 
                
Ambiguity 
aversion 
  Hypothetical choice between a bag with 
known and unknown number of balls of 
different color 
0.13 0.13   n.a.   
                
Reciprocity   Hypothetical choice of the amount of a gift 
given to a stranger who provided help 
0.12 0.29***   0.35*** experimental 
different; 
survey 
comparable 
Reciprocity 
(diff) 
  Hypothetical choice of the amount of a gift 
given to a stranger who provided help 
0.06 0.19**   n.a. 
                
Altruism generalized Hypothetical choice of the amount donated 
to a charity (out of Ksh3200) 
0.41*** 0.41***   0.39*** comparable 
in-group Hypothetical choice of the amount donated 
to a charity that helps people in ancestral 
home area (out of Ksh3200) 
0.33*** 0.36***   n.a.   
out-group Hypothetical choice of the amount donated 
to a charity that helps people in other parts 
of Kenya than ancestral home area (out of 
Ksh3200) 
0.40*** 0.38***   n.a.   
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Anti-social 
behavior 
generalized Hypothetical decision between (3200, 3200) 
or (3150, 1600) for self and for another 
person 
0.05 0.05   n.a.   
in-group Hypothetical decision between (3200, 3200) 
or (3150, 1600) for self and for a person 
from ancestral home area 
0.07 0.07   n.a.   
out-group Hypothetical decision between (3200, 3200) 
or (3150, 1600) for self and for a person 
from other parts of Kenya than ancestral 
home area 
0.14 0.14   n.a.   
 
Notes: Column 1 is an OLS coefficient from a regression of the standardized experimental measure on the standardized survey item. Column 2 displays Spearman 
correlations between the survey item and the respective experimental measure (one for each preference type, except for reciprocity, where we use two experimental 
measures).   ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Column 3 displays the correlation between experimental and 
quantitative survey measures from the validation study of Becker et al. (2016) among university students in Germany. Column 4 indicates to what extent measures 
from our study in Kenya and measures from the German study are comparable. 
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Table 2: Correlations between qualitative survey measures and experimental measures 
      Kenya: Kibera residents   Germany: Bonn students 
Preference Qualitative survey item OLS 
Coefficient 
Correlation   Correlation Measures 
      (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Time   Willingness to give up something that is 
beneficial today in order to benefit more in the 
future 
0.04 0.06   -0.41*** comparable 
                
Risk   Willingness to take risks 0.01 -0.02   0.35*** comparable 
                
Reciprocity    Willingness to return a favor 0.11 0.06   0.30*** experimental 
different; survey 
comparable 
Reciprocity 
(diff) 
  Willingness to return a favor 0.21** 0.14     
                
Altruism generalized, measure 1 Willingness to give to a charity  0.03 0.07   0.38*** comparable 
generalized, measure 2 Willingness to share with others -0.06 -0.02   0.23*** comparable 
in-group, measure 1 Willingness to give to a charity that helps 
people in ancestral home area 
-0.03 -0.09   n.a.   
in-group, measure 2 Willingness to share with others from ancestral 
home area 
-0.05 -0.05   n.a.   
out-group, measure 1 Willingness to give to a charity that helps 
people in other parts of Kenya than ancestral 
home area 
0.18** 0.12   n.a.   
out-group, measure 2 Willingness to share with people from other 
parts of Kenya than ancestral home area 
0.12 0.13   n.a.   
                
Anti-social 
behavior 
generalized, measure 1 Willingness to cause troubles to other people -0.1 -0.05   n.a.   
generalized, measure 2 Willingness to make harm to other people 0.01 0.05   n.a.   
in-group, measure 1 Willingness to cause troubles to people in 
ancestral home area 
-0.02 -0.003   n.a.   
in-group, measure 2 Willingness to make harm to people in 
ancestral home area 
0.11 0.15   n.a.   
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out-group, measure 1 Willingness to cause troubles to people from 
other parts of Kenya than ancestral home area 
-0.01 0.02   n.a.   
out-group, measure 2 Willingness to make harm to people from 
other parts of Kenya than ancestral home area 
0.01 0.03   n.a.   
 
Notes: Column 1 displays OLS coefficients in a regression of the standardized experimental measure on the standardized module items. Column 2 displays 
Spearman correlations between the survey item and the respective experimental measure (one for each preference type, except for reciprocity, where we use two 
experimental measures).  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Column 3 displays the correlation between experimental 
and qualitative survey measure from the validation study of Becker et al. (2016) among university students in Germany. Column 4 indicates to what extent measures 
from our study in Kenya and measures from the German study are comparable. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX A 
Additional Tables 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max N 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Experimental measures           
Time preference 9.15 9.11 1 26 123 
Risk preference 6.82 6.05 1 22 123 
Ambiguity aversion 0.24 0.43 0 1 123 
Reciprocity  257.33 259.37 0 1000 123 
Reciprocity (diff) 179.8 260.73 -400 1000 123 
Alturism - generalized 205.45 213.7 0 1000 123 
Altruism - in-group 213.13 221.65 0 1000 123 
Altruism - out-group 165.71 183.31 0 1000 123 
Anti-social behavior - generalized 0.2 0.4 0 1 123 
Anti-social behavior - in-group 0.23 0.43 0 1 115 
Anti-social behavior - out-group 0.38 0.49 0 1 123 
Panel B: Survey quantitative measures           
Time preference 7.58 11.92 1 32 123 
Risk preference 11.93 11.11 1 32 123 
Ambiguity aversion 0.24 0.43 0 1 123 
Reciprocity  269.15 403.87 0 2000 123 
Alturism - generalized 645.45 689 0 3200 123 
Altruism - in-group 708.82 712.68 0 3200 123 
Altruism - out-group 663.65 724.59 0 3200 123 
Anti-social behavior - generalized 0.17 0.38 0 1 123 
Anti-social behavior - in-group 0.19 0.39 0 1 123 
Anti-social behavior - out-group 0.24 0.43 0 1 123 
Panel C: Survey qualitative measures           
Time preference 7.54 3.03 0 10 123 
Risk preference 6.93 2.94 0 10 123 
Reciprocity  8.92 2.22 0 10 123 
Alturism - generalized, measure 1 6.89 3.34 0 10 123 
Altruism - in-group, measure 1 7.63 3.02 0 10 123 
Altruism - out-group, measure 1 6.81 3.21 0 10 123 
Alturism - generalized, measure 2 7.72 3.04 0 10 123 
Altruism - in-group, measure 2 7.32 3.29 0 10 123 
Altruism - out-group, measure 2 7.02 3.37 0 10 123 
Anti-social behavior - generalized, measure 1 2.37 3.56 0 10 123 
Anti-social behavior - in-group, measure 1 2.37 3.69 0 10 123 
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Anti-social behavior - out-group, measure 1 2.17 3.39 0 10 123 
Anti-social behavior - generalized, measure 2 1.98 3.47 0 10 123 
Anti-social behavior - in-group, measure 2 2.24 3.7 0 10 123 
Anti-social behavior - out-group, measure 2 1.97 3.42 0 10 123 
Panel D - Observable characteristics           
Age 29.79 4.82 20 46 119 
Female 0.54 0.5 0 1 123 
Unemployed 0.54 0.5 0 1 123 
Number of children 1.92 1.62 0 9 123 
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Table A2: Robustness checks – correlation between experimental and quantitative survey measures 
  Controlling for:   Sub-sample 
Preference type (dependent 
variable - experimental measure, 
explanatory variable - 
quantitative survey measure) 
No 
controls 
Qualitative 
measure(s) 
Understanding; 
and consistency 
(where 
applicable) 
Age, gender, 
being 
unemployed and 
number of 
children 
Order of tasks and 
order of 
survey/experiments; 
and understanding 
and consistency 
(where applicable)   
Survey 
questions 
in the first 
week 
Experimental 
choices in the 
first week 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) 
                  
Time preference  0.33*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.33***   0.31*** 0.39*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)   (0.10) (0.14) 
Risk preference  0.21** 0.22** 0.25*** 0.19** 0.25***   0.32** 0.12 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)   (0.13) (0.13) 
Ambiguity aversion 0.13   0.14 0.09 0.12   0.18 0.08 
  (0.09)   (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)   (0.13) (0.13) 
Reciprocity 0.12 0.10   0.15 0.11   0.20 0.07 
  (0.09) (0.09)   (0.09) (0.09)   (0.13) (0.13) 
Reciprocity (diff) 0.06 0.04   0.07 0.06   0.13 0.03 
  (0.09) (0.09)   (0.09) (0.09)   (0.13) (0.13) 
Generalized altruism 0.41*** 0.43***   0.44*** 0.44***   0.33*** 0.67*** 
  (0.08) (0.08)   (0.09) (0.09)   (0.10) (0.16) 
In-group altruism 0.33*** 0.36***   0.32*** 0.36***   0.26** 0.54*** 
  (0.09) (0.09)   (0.09) (0.09)   (0.10) (0.17) 
Out-group altruism 0.40*** 0.38***   0.35*** 0.39***   0.27** 0.54*** 
  (0.08) (0.09)   (0.09) (0.09)   (0.12) (0.12) 
Generalized antisocial 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05   -0.02 0.09 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)   (0.12) (0.14) 
In-group antisocial 0.07 0.07   0.06 0.09   0.08 0.08 
  (0.10) (0.10)   (0.10) (0.10)   (0.12) (0.16) 
Out-group antisocial 0.14 0.14   0.14 0.13   0.24* 0.03 
  (0.09) (0.09)   (0.09) (0.09)   (0.13) (0.13) 
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Notes: OLS, standard errors in parentheses. Each cell provides a coefficient from a separate regression, in which the dependent variable is the experimental measure 
of a given preference type, and the explanatory variable is a quantitative survey measures of the same preference type. All measures of preferences are standardized. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3: The role of memory 
Dependent variable 
Time 
preference 
Risk 
preference Reiprocity 
Reciprocity 
(diff) 
Ambiguity 
aversion 
Generalized 
altruism 
Ingroup 
altruism 
Outgroup 
altruism 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Quantitative measure 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.25* 0.44*** 0.38*** 0.51*** 
  (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) 
Good memory*Quantitative measure 0.40** 0.09 -0.20 -0.21 -0.16 -0.00 -0.03 -0.29 
  (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) 
Qualitative measure 0.27** -0.04 0.14 0.25**   0.12 -0.10 -0.07 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11)   (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) 
Good memory*Qualitative measure -0.36** 0.17 0.04 -0.10   -0.23 -0.08 0.10 
  (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)   (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) 
Qualitative measure 2           -0.10 0.10 0.20 
            (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) 
Good memory*Qualitative measure2           -0.05 -0.20 -0.30 
            (0.18) (0.21) (0.21) 
Good memory (above median) 0.15 -0.20 -0.59*** -0.24 -0.26 -0.03 -0.40** -0.33* 
  (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Constant -0.09 0.11 0.31** 0.13 0.15 0.01 0.20 0.19 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
                  
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 
R-squared 0.190 0.064 0.117 0.073 0.039 0.201 0.178 0.224 
Notes: OLS, standard errors in parentheses. All measures of preferences are standardized. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX B 
Design of the validation experiment 
 
Below, we describe in detail how we elicited each of the experimental and survey measures. The full 
experimental and survey protocols in English and Swahili are available in Appendix C and D.  Where 
relevant, for convenience we also carefully compare the similarities and differences between our approach 
and the original validation experiment implemented by Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, Falk, & Sunde (2016) 
- BDHFS. 
 
Sample 
The sample in our study are 123 participants from the Kibera neighborhood in Nairobi, Kenya during 
August 2018. The participants come from a low income environment, are between 20 and 46 years of age, 
more than a half are unemployed, half of them are women and on average they have two children. The 
average monthly earnings among those who reported this measure (N=57) is approximately USD 96.  
 
Experimental measures 
We conducted a set of incentivized choice experiments in which each type of preferences is elicited in one 
experimental task. Specifically, we implemented ten experiments in total, focusing on the following types 
of preferences: time preference, risk preference, reciprocity, ambiguity aversion, generalized altruism, in-
group altruism, out-group altruism, generalized anti-social behavior, in-group antisocial behavior, and out-
group antisocial behavior. 
BDHFS also elicited measures of time preference, risk preference, altruism, and reciprocity. We will focus 
on comparison of the experiments in these four domains where there is an overlap between the two studies. 
In addition, BDHFS elicited measures of trust and negative reciprocity, and they implemented nine 
experiments in total.  
Time preference 
We conducted an experiment that involved 25 binary choices between a payment “today” and a higher 
payment that would be received in 3 months in the future. The delayed payment in each subsequent binary 
choice increased such that the implied 3-months return from waiting would rise in steps of 5 percentage 
points from 0 percent in the first binary choice to 120 percent in the 25th binary choice. The payment today 
was in all 25 binary choices KSh 600, while the payment in 3 months increased from KSh 600 in the first 
binary choice to KSh 1320 in the last binary choice. (The exchange rate during the study period was 
approximately 100 KSh to 1 USD.) If a choice in this experiment was selected to be payoff relevant, the 
money was sent to participant’s mobile phone via M-PESA, either on the day of the experiment, or 3 months 
later. The row in which a participant switched from preferring the earlier payment to the larger delayed 
payment provides a measure of time preference. 
BDHFS conducted two experiments to elicit measures of time preference with 25 binary choices each. In 
both price lists, participants had to trade-off a payment of 400 points “today" and a higher payment that 
would be received 12 months in the future. In one price list, the delayed amount was increased such that 
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the implied annual return from waiting would rise in steps of 2.5 percentage points from 0 percent in the 
first row to 60 percent in the 25th row. In the second price list the delayed payments were perturbed by 
adding or subtracting an amount of up to 0.6 points. The payments were sent by regular mail. In both 
experiments, the row in which a participant switched from preferring the earlier payment to the larger 
delayed payment provides a measure of impatience. The ultimate measure of time preference was 
constructed by averaging the switching rows in the two discounting experiments.  
Our experiment closely follows the first experiment implemented by BDHFS. It differs in terms of (i) the 
amount of the payment “today”, (ii) the delay (3 months instead of 12 months) and (iii) the annual return 
from waiting. We changed the delay and the interest rate based on a pilot study which suggested that there 
would be limited variation in the measure of time preference if we used exactly the same parameters as in 
BDHFS. 
Risk preference 
We conducted an experiment that involved 21 binary choices between a safe payment and a lottery that 
yielded with equal probability KSh 0 or KSh 2,000. The lottery was the same in all binary choices, while 
the safe payment was increased in steps of KSh 100 from KSh 0 in the first binary choice to KSh 2,000 in 
the 21st binary choice. Also, here we follow closely the approach of BDHFS who implemented this 
experiment, the only difference being the specific amounts. In their case, the lottery was between 0 and 
1,000 points, while the safe payment was increased in steps of 50 points from 0 to 1,000. In addition, 
BDHFS implemented a second price list in which they perturbed the safe payments by adding or subtracting 
up to five points to each safe payment alternative. The row in which a participant switched from preferring 
the lottery to preferring the safe payment is a measure of risk preference. The measure in BDHFS is 
constructed by averaging the switching rows in the two experiments. 
Altruism  
Each participant was endowed with KSh 1,000 and had to decide how much of that amount to donate to a 
charity that helps people in Kenya. The task is very similar to BDHFS, with small differences in the 
wording. In BDHFS, participants were endowed with 300 points and made a decision how many points to 
assign to a charitable organization (by choosing a specific organization from a provided list or by naming 
a different one). The amount donated to a charity is a measure of altruism. 
Reciprocity 
Each participant was endowed with KSh 1,000 and had to decide how much of that amount to give to two 
other people who visited the lab in the past. The participants were informed that each of these people 
received two bags of sugar and could decide to leave one of the bags for a future visitor of the lab. One of 
them decided to give a bag of sugar while the other one not. We use two measures of reciprocity – the 
amount assigned to the “kind” person who left a bag of sugar for the participants, and the difference in the 
amounts assigned to the “kind” person and to the other person who did not leave a bag of sugar for the 
participant. Our measure of reciprocity differs from that of BDHFS who elicit the measure of positive 
reciprocity from second mover behavior in the Trust game.  
We elicited further measures of preferences which were not included in the BDHFS study. 
Ambiguity aversion 
23 
We conducted an experiment in which participants made a choice whether to draw a ball from one or from 
another jar. In jar 1, there were ten balls, out of which four were green and six were yellow. In jar 2, there 
were also ten balls, but the number of green and yellow balls was unknown. If jar 1 was chosen, the 
participant needed to draw a green ball to win KSh 1,000. If jar 2 was chosen, the participant needed to 
choose a color and draw a ball of that color to win KSh 1,000. The choice of jar 1 is our measure of 
ambiguity aversion. 
Anti-social behavior 
In the task related to anti-social behavior, each participant was matched with an anonymous person from 
Kenya and both of them received an endowment of KSh 1,000. The participant made a choice between two 
options. The first one was to keep KSh 1,000 for self and KSh 1,000 for the other person. The second one 
was to lower the amount of the other person by KSh 500, but this cost the participant KSh 20, and thus the 
participant would receive KSh 980 and the other person KSh 500. The choice of the second option is our 
measure of anti-social behavior. 
In-group and out-group measures of altruism and anti-social behavior 
In total, we elicited three measures of altruism and three measures of anti-social behavior. Besides the 
generalized measures described above, we elicited a measure of behavior towards members of participants’ 
in-group and towards out-group members. In the in-group version of the experiment on altruism, the 
participants were informed that they could donate a part of their endowment to a charity that helped people 
in their ancestral home area. Similarly, in the in-group version of the experiment on anti-social behavior, 
they were informed they were matched with an unknown person from their ancestral home area. In the out-
group version of the experiment on altruism, they were informed that the charity helped people from other 
parts of Kenya than their ancestral home area. In the out-group version of the experiment on anti-social 
behavior they were matched with an unknown person from Kenya, but not from their ancestral home area. 
The formulation “from your home area” was carefully selected from a list of possible information indicating 
one’s own ethnic group based on a detailed conversation with the Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) 
field team in Kenya.  
 
Survey measures 
To measure each type of preference, we use one quantitative survey measure and one or two qualitative 
survey measures (one for time preference, risk preference and reciprocity; two for altruism and anti-social 
behavior). The only exception is ambiguity aversion for which there is only one quantitative survey 
measure. The quantitative questions present a hypothetical scenario that mimics closely the experimental 
task. The qualitative questions measure willingness to act in a certain way on 0-10 scale. In total, the 
participants answered 25 survey questions. 
In their validation experiment, BDHFS used a larger number of survey questions to measure each type of 
preference. In total, they included 199 questions. Then, the researchers identified the best linear 
combination of items for measuring a particular preference type and these items were selected to be included 
in GPS. For some measures, the researchers, when developing this streamlined version of the survey 
module, used survey items which have slightly lower predictive power but are simpler and faster to 
implement. In some cases, they also adjusted the wording such that it can be used in different cultures. For 
example, instead of asking the whole set of binary choices on time/risk preference which is time-consuming, 
only a sub-set of five interdependent questions was included in GPS. In our study, the survey questions on 
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time preference, risk preference, reciprocity and altruism follow very closely the GPS questions. We use 
exactly the same or slightly adjusted wording of the questions included in the Swahili version of GPS for 
Kenya. In addition, we designed new questions on other types of preferences we are interested in (ambiguity 
aversion, anti-social behavior) and include the in-group and out-group versions of questions on altruism 
and anti-social behavior.  
Below, we provide description of the questions used in our study, as well as – where relevant – a comparison 
to GPS-Kenya questions, and questions used in the validation study of BDHFS for which correlations with 
experimental measures are displayed in Tables 1 and 2. 
Time preference 
Quantitative measure. Since the experiment involved 25 binary choices and making decision in all of these 
is rather time-consuming, for the quantitative survey measure we use the “staircase” or “unfolding brackets” 
procedure where each participant answered a sub-set of five binary choices. First, they made a choice 
between KSh 300 today or KSh 461 in 12 months. In the second and all subsequent binary choices, the 
immediate payment remained the same, but the delayed payment changed based on the previous decision. 
If the participant had chosen the immediate payment, the delayed payment in the subsequent binary choice 
was increased. If the participant had chosen the delayed payment, the delayed payment in the subsequent 
binary choice was decreased. In total, there were 31 binary choices out of which each participants faced 
five. The measure of time preference takes the values between 1 (preference of the immediate payment in 
a situation with the highest delayed payment, specifically KSh 644) and 32 (preference of delayed payment 
in a situation with the lowest delayed payment, specifically KSh 309).  
Qualitative measure. In the qualitative survey item, the participants were asked “How willing are you to 
give up something that is beneficial for you today in order to benefit from that in the future?” and indicated 
their answer on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means “completely unwilling to do so”, and 10 means “very 
willing to do so”. Both the quantitative and qualitative survey measure are identical with the GPS-Kenya 
questions. 
Risk preference 
Quantitative measure. Similarly to time preference, to elicit quantitative survey measure of risk preference, 
we use the “staircase” method. First, the participants made a choice between a draw with a 50-percent 
chance of receiving KSh 900 and the same 50-percent chance of receiving nothing, or the amount of KSh 
480 as a sure payment. In the second and all subsequent decisions, the lottery remained the same. If the 
participant had chosen the safe option, the safe option in the subsequent question was smaller. If the 
participant had chosen the lottery, the safe option in the subsequent question was larger. In total, there were 
31 binary choices out of which each participants faced five. The measure of risk preference takes the values 
between 1 (preference of sure payment in a situation with the lowest sure payment, specifically KSh 30) 
and 32 (preference of lottery in a situation with the highest sure payment, specifically KSh 930). The 
quantitative survey measure of risk preference is identical with the GPS-Kenya questions. 
Qualitative measure. In the qualitative survey item, the participants were asked “Please tell me, in general, 
how willing or unwilling you are to take risks. Let me explain what I mean by risk. Imagine you are going 
to start a business. You are going to take risk because you do not know if the business will succeed or if it 
will fail.” and indicated their answer on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means “completely unwilling to take 
risks”, and 10 means “very willing to take risks”. The qualitative survey measure of risk preference is 
similar to the GPS-Kenya question, but based on a pilot session which revealed that the participants had 
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hard times to understand the term “risks”, we expanded the wording adding an explanation what we mean 
by risk. The original GPS question asks “Please tell me, in general, how willing or unwilling you are to 
take risks.” The question used in the validation experiment by BDHFS is “Generally speaking, are you a 
person who is willing to take risks or do you try to avoid risks?”. 
Altruism 
Quantitative measure. The participants were asked “Imagine the following situation: Today you 
unexpectedly received KSh 3,200. How much of this amount would you donate to a charity?”. This question 
closely follows the GPS-Kenya question, including the specific amount. The difference is that the GPS asks 
about donating “to a good cause”, while we ask about donating “to a charity”.  
Qualitative measures. We use two qualitative survey measures of altruism. One asks respondents “How 
willing are you to give to a charity without expecting anything in return?”.  The participants rate their 
willingness on 0-10 scale. Again, with the exception of the formulation “to a charity” instead of “to good 
causes”, the question is the same as in GPS. Nevertheless, the validation in the study by BDHFS was based 
on a survey question with included the formulation “when it comes to charity”. Because the term “charity” 
caused confusion in some countries, for the purposes of the GPS module the formulation was changed to 
“good cause”. The second question is “Are you a person who is generally willing to share with others 
without expecting anything in return, or are you not willing to do so?” This was used by BDHFS in their 
validation experiment but was not selected to be included in GPS. 
Reciprocity 
Quantitative measure. The participants were described the following scenario: “Please think about what 
you would do in the following situation. You are in a city you are not familiar with, and you realize you 
lost your way. You ask a stranger for directions. The stranger offers to walk with you and show you the 
way to your destination. By helping you the stranger misses an hour of work and thus loses 50 shillings in 
total. However, the stranger says he or she does not want any money from you. When you arrive to your 
destination, you can buy a gift for the stranger in a shop.” Then they were asked whether they buy a “thank-
you” gift for the stranger and how much money they would spend on the present. The amount spent on the 
present is our quantitative measure of reciprocity.  
The quantitative question on reciprocity in GPS-Kenya is similar in spirit, but again we made some 
adjustments in the wording based on the pilot and discussions with the local team. The original GPS 
question asks “Please think about what you would do in the following situation. You are in an area you are 
not familiar with, and you realize that you lost your way. You ask a stranger for directions. The stranger 
offers to take you to your destination. Helping you costs the stranger about KSh 60 in total. However, the 
stranger says he or she does not want any money from you. You have six presents with you. The cheapest 
present costs KSh 15, the most expensive one costs KSh 90. Do you give one of the presents to the stranger 
as a “thank-you” gift?” The participants could choose between giving no presents, or a present which costs 
KSh. 15/30/45/60/75/90. 
The question in the validation of BDHFS is: “Imagine the following situation: you are shopping in an 
unfamiliar city and realize you lost your way. You ask a stranger for directions. The stranger offers to take 
you with their car to your destination. The ride takes about 20 minutes and costs the stranger about 20 Euro 
in total. The stranger does not want money for it. You carry six bottles of wine with you. The cheapest 
bottle costs 5 Euro, the most expensive one 30 Euro. You decide to give one of the bottles to the stranger 
as a thank-you gift. Which bottle do you give?”. 
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Qualitative measure. The participants were asked to say how well the following statement describes them: 
“When someone does me a favor I am willing to return it.” They provided answer on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means “does not describe me at all”, and 10 means “describes me perfectly”. The qualitative survey 
question on reciprocity is identical with the GPS question. 
As in the experiments, we elicited further measures of preferences which are not a part of GPS. 
Ambiguity aversion 
Quantitative measure. In the survey, we included a single (quantitative) measure of ambiguity aversion. 
The participants were asked to imagine that they were going to play a game and they were described the 
experimental task we implemented to elicit measure of ambiguity aversion.  
Anti-social behavior 
Quantitative measure. The participants were asked to imagine a situation mimicking the experimental task 
in which they and another unknown person unexpectedly received an opportunity to get KSh 3,200 each. 
Then they were asked to make a choice between two options, one in which both the participant and another 
person receive KSh 3,200, and one in which the participant receives KSh 3,150 and the other person 
receives KSh 1,600. The choice of the second option is our quantitative survey measure of anti-social 
behavior. 
Qualitative measures. We designed two qualitative survey items to measure anti-social behavior. We asked 
participants “How willing or unwilling are you to cause troubles to other people?”, and “How willing or 
unwilling are you to make harm to other people?”. In both cases, the participants rated their willingness on 
a 0-10 scale. 
In-group and out-group measures of altruism and anti-social behavior 
We included the in-group and out-group variants of all three survey questions on altruism and of all three 
survey questions on anti-social behavior.  As in the experiments, the distinction was made by using the 
formulation “from your ancestral home area” vs. “from other parts of Kenya other than your ancestral home 
area” 
 
Payments and procedures 
On average, the earnings of the participants from both the experimental and survey sessions were KSh 
1,520, i.e. an equivalent of approximately five days earnings. Specifically, for the experimental part, the 
participant received a show up fee of KSh 250 (KSh 200 for participation and KSh 50 if they arrived on 
time). After they finished all the experimental tasks, one of the decisions they made was randomly selected 
to be payoff relevant. On average, the payoff was KSh 820. For the survey part, the participants received a 
show up fee of KSh 450 (KSh 400 plus KSh 50 if they arrived on time). 
The participants visited the lab twice. During one session they made choices in all the experimental tasks, 
and during the other session they answered the survey questions. The two visits were one week apart and 
we randomized the order of the experiments vs. survey. This approach aims to limit the spillovers between 
the experimental and survey measures, for example due to an effort to give consistent answers. To address 
this concern further, we included a task to measure participants’ memory. In the first week, the participants 
were shown a set of ten letters from the alphabet on a screen for twenty seconds. In the second week, they 
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were asked to recall these letters. In the analysis, we can test whether the correlation between experimental 
and survey measures is driven by participants with better memory. In the experimental session, we further 
randomized at the session level the order of a set of experiments focusing on (i) time preference, risk 
preference, and ambiguity aversion, and (ii) altruism, reciprocity, and anti-social behavior. 
